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Abstract: The article explores one of the causes of the financial crisis of
2008 and of financial crises generally. The argument of the paper is that rather
than tend toward equilibrium, financial and asset markets have a tendency to
become unstable after prolonged periods of stability. The main driver of this
process is the expansion of credit. Debt feeds its way into higher asset prices
which in turn justify the accumulation of more debt to purchase further assets, and
so on. The basis for the idea is Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis,
itself a reinterpretation of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
by J.M. Keynes. The main proposal the article suggests is that monetary and
regulatory policy should become more stringent as the boom proceeds, since even
rational individuals cannot be expected to refrain from perpetuating the cycle.
INTRODUCTION
Apart from its ruinous and protracted impact, one of the most remarkable
aspects of the recent financial crisis is surely its seemingly endless list of causes.1
Much like Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express2 in which all the main
*Candidate for L.L.M., Fordham University School of Law, 2011.
1
The large number of books and articles that have been written about the subject in a relatively
short period of time is arguably testament to this.
2
AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS (Reissue Ed., Harper Paperbacks 2011)
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suspects are implicated, the net of culpability has been cast wide, to catch
everything from risky mortgages to misunderstood financial innovation, skewed
incentives at investment banks, and regulators asleep at the wheel. Some
commentators have even gone so far as to suggest that China’s one-child policy
played a part in the debacle,3 while others blame whoever was not listening to
them before the crunch.4
Countless rules have been proposed and enacted in response, many
invariably involving more government powers and oversight.5
This is
understandable – to an extent – given that there have indeed been widespread
regulatory shortcomings.6 However, and as this paper will suggest, more
regulation will not prevent another crisis if it does not address the underlying
deficiencies of the financial system. Despite President Obama’s claim that the
Dodd-Frank Act will prevent another crisis from “ever happening again,”7 history
shows that regulation designed “for the last crisis does not prevent the next.”8
Higher accounting standards, for example, introduced earlier this decade did
nothing to prevent the recent fiasco. In order to formulate an effective regulatory
response, a close look at the underlying nature of the financial system is needed.
This paper will try to do just that. It will look at what it is about the financial
system that makes it so prone to waves of bubbles followed by recessions, and how
government policies – both regulatory and monetary – have contributed to the
fiasco that has engulfed the global economy in recent years.9 Part I will look at a
number of economic theories in order to attempt to explain the system’s inherent
weaknesses, and Part II will try to shed some light on recent events in this context.
Part III will look at what the regulatory response should be.
The main argument of this paper is that, rather than settle for an optimal
equilibrium, the financial system is in fact inherently unstable, and, after periods of
stability, ends up in a self-reinforcing spiral towards instability. The expansion of
credit is the key driver behind this process.10 It fuels the cycle, helps create asset

(1934) (renamed “Murder in the Calais Coach” in the U.S.).
3
Posting of Patrick Love to OECD Insights, Chinese demography: One child, many consequences,
http://oecdinsights.org/2010/03/26/chinese-demography-one-child-many-consequences/
(Mar.
26,
2010). Introduced in China in the late 1970s, one of the effects of the policy has been a proportionally
higher number of boys in relation to girls. Id. Worried about their sons’ prospects of finding a bride,
Chinese families feel that the accumulation of wealth is one way to compete for the attention of bridesto-be. Id. It is suggested these savings have contributed to the global imbalances and loose monetary
policy in the West, in turn contributing to asset price bubbles and the ensuing crisis.
4
See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2008).
5
See, e.g., Dealbook, New S.E.C. Powers in Dodd-Frank Act, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010; see also
The Dodd-Frank Act, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES COMMENTARY
AND INSIGHTS, July 12, 2010, http://www.skadden.com/Cimages/siteFile/Skadden_Insights_
Special_Edition_Dodd-Frank_Act1.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Michael Pomerleano, The failure of financial regulation, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009
available at http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2009/01/the-failure-of-financial-regulation/.
7
A decent start, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/164
81494.
8
GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES, vii (First Vintage Books ed. 2008).
9
See infra Part I.D.
10
See infra Part I.D.
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bubbles, leaves debtors woefully ill-prepared to cope with shocks and prolongs the
hangover that inevitably follows.11 It follows that any serious attempt to prevent a
repeat of the crisis should aim to manage the credit creation process as well as the
accumulation of debt. The implication is that regulatory policy should become
progressively more stringent as the boom proceeds, as even rational individuals
cannot be expected to refrain from perpetuating it.
Of course, systemic risk cannot be eliminated, and the idea would not be to
purge the system of crises altogether, but to reduce the risks they pose while
increasing the financial system’s resilience.12 The paper will also recognize the
limitations of regulation or any other proposals: if the system is indeed inherently
unstable then no amount of intervention – by central banks or regulators - will be
able to eliminate the risks we face, short of a switch to a different system
altogether. In addition, economic theories are of course just that, and each will
have a counterargument, which raises the question of whether these theories should
form the basis of policy responses at all.
I. THEORY
A. Why Financial Markets are Different
Of all of Adam Smith’s insightful statements, the notion of an “invisible
hand”13 is surely the most famous. In its original context, the term implied that
society’s interests are best advanced through an individual’s pursuit of his own.
However, today the phrase is widely interpreted to mean that markets tend towards
equilibrium; that is, a situation where demand and supply are in balance.14 If for
some reason that balance is disturbed, the market will adjust and move towards a
new equilibrium.15
This, in essence, is the basis for the efficient market hypothesis.16 The
premise of the hypothesis is that the price of an asset reflects all available
information, and thus that all prices are in fact correct and in equilibrium.17 If
asset prices are too low, informed buyers will promptly take advantage of these
and drive the price back up, just as overvalued assets would attract short sellers
who will drive the price down again. The theory has been extremely influential: It
has formed the basis of the federal securities laws,18 court decisions interpreting
11

See infra Part II.D.
William Murden, Director, U.S. Treasury, Office of Int’l Banking and Sec. Mkts, Speech
presented at the Derivatives and Risk Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets
at Fordham University School of Law, Banking Supervision and Government Policy: The Role of
Regulators in International Financial Reform (Jan. 28, 1999) http://law2.fordham.edu/publications/
articles/600flspub9510.pdf.
13
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS book IV, ch. II (1776).
14
COOPER, supra note 8, at 93.
15
MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS A-Z (Bloomberg Press 2d ed. 2009).
16
Although this does not imply that Smith himself would have agreed with the claims made on
behalf of the efficient market hypothesis today.
17
BISHOP, supra note 15.
18
WILLIAM ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION (Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2008).
12
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them,19 and the financial engineering that takes place on Wall Street.20
Notably, efficient market hypothesis does not allow for the existence of
bubbles nor do adherents of the theory believe that government intervention to
respond to them is justified until after these have burst. Writing about the real
estate mania of the time, the Chicago Tribune of April 13, 1890 summed up the
elements of a bubble: “men who bought property at prices they knew perfectly
well were fictitious, but who were prepared to pay such prices simply because they
knew that some still greater fool could be depended on to take the property off
their hands and leave them with a profit.”21
Economists differ in their opinions on the causes of the existence of bubbles,
but a salient feature is a rise in the price of assets that cannot be explained by
fundamentals, i.e. the income likely to be earned from holding the asset.22 This is
at odds with the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that prices are always
justified.
For the market in goods and services, this is a plausible argument.23 Yet
whereas people buy a consumer good because of its inherent value, they buy
financial assets for a different reason: to make them financially better off.24 When
they invest, they are therefore looking for an asset which is scarce, the supply of
which cannot be increased easily. As Ben Bernanke explained before becoming
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, “[l]ike gold, U.S. dollars have value only to the
extent that they are strictly limited in supply.”25 “By increasing the number of
U.S. dollars in circulation,” he went on to say, “the U.S. government can also
reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services.”26 Likewise, if the
supply of assets could be increased at no cost, they would have little value as an
investment. Public companies could certainly issue additional shares whenever
their price reaches a certain level (thereby diluting the wealth of existing holders),
but those in the habit of doing so routinely would soon have difficulty attracting
investors.27
Instead of demand stimulating supply, in asset markets a lack of supply

19
See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989); Seaboard World
Airlines v. Tiger Int’l, 600 F.2d 355, 362 (2d Cir. 1979).
20
Efficiency and beyond, ECONOMIST, July 16, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/14030296.
21
BISHOP, supra note 15.
22
Id.
23
When demand for a good goes up, so does its price. This is then met with an increase in supply
as producers take advantage of the situation to maximize their income. Once demand for the product
falls again, perhaps because consumers have consumed enough of it or a competitor enters the market,
the producer will lower his prices to accommodate this new level of demand, and there is a new
equilibrium.
24
Buttonwood: A special case, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com
/node/16792858.
25
Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd, Remarks Made Before the National Economists
Club, Washington, D.C.: Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here (Nov. 21, 2002) (available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm).
26
Id.
27
COOPER, supra note 8, at 8.
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stimulates demand, and rising asset prices are seen as a cause to buy.28 Rather than
move toward equilibrium, prices can thus steadfastly move away from it. The way
consumers and investors react differently to supply constraints and price changes
indicates that an altogether different mechanism seems to operate in the financial
and asset markets,29 and one might question if there is another paradigm through
which the financial system can be evaluated.
B. Reflexivity
George Soros’ concept of “reflexivity,” published in 1987,30 itself a reinterpretation of older non-economic theories, echoes this belief.31 In sociology,
the theory reflects the notion that individuals will act according to their
calculations of how they believe others will act.32
Soros believes that as applied to economic theory, it is the bias of
participants in the market and their imperfect understanding that drives events. It
is not the sole driver,33 but its presence is enough to “render the equilibrium
position unattainable.”34 While markets have numerous participants with
individual biases, these may cancel each other out to leave what he terms the
“prevailing bias,” with a stock’s price the common denominator.35 A change in
this price (which way will depend on whether the prevailing bias is positive or
negative) will further affect this bias, and so on.36 As the interplay is on-going,
there is no tendency toward equilibrium, and the variables reinforce each other in
one direction before going on to another after a particular event.37
This statement is of course merely an elaborate way to describe the business
cycle, or boom and bust. The model takes into account that stock prices are also
driven by the “fundamentals” of earnings, dividends, cash flow and the like: the
reinforcing process therefore does not operate unrestrained, but undergoes orderly
corrections. However, this tends to happen in the early stages. As the cycle
advances, these corrections become scarcer and the likelihood of a bust grows.38
Thus, rather than move toward equilibrium, Soros asserts that asset markets

28
A special report on the future of finance: Wild animal spirits, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/12957779.
29
Id.
30
GEORGE SOROS, THE ALCHEMY OF FINANCE: READING THE MIND OF THE MARKET (1987)
[hereinafter ALCHEMY OF FINANCE].
31
See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998); THE CRASH OF 2008 AND
WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 4 (expanding upon
Soros’s theory).
32
In sociology this is known as the “Thomas Theorem,” named after sociologist William I.
Thomas. Robert K. Merton, The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect, 74 SOC. FORCES 379, 389
(1995). As he put it, “if men define situations that are real, they are real in their consequences.” Id. at
380. In other words, prophecies may well turn out to be self-fulfilling.
33
ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30, at 43.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 52.
37
Id. at 70.
38
ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30, at 52.
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actually have a tendency to move away from it.
C. Introducing the Financial Instability Hypothesis
The accumulation of debt has the capacity to greatly accentuate this process.
That is the view expounded by Hyman Minsky, an American economist who spent
much of his career analyzing financial crises.39 His hypothesis,40 in his own
words, is a theory of “the impact of debt on system behavior,” and his key
observation was that people’s attitudes to risk – and thus debt – develop in
stages.41 In each stage a different type of economic unit (with its own income-debt
characteristics) dominates the economy, with each unit more cavalier in its
approach to risk as time goes on.42 He divided these units into three categories:
hedging, speculative, and Ponzi.43
Hedging units are borrowers that have sufficient cash flows to finance
payments of principal and interest, and the equity component in their financing
structure is relatively sizeable.44 If this type of financing is prevalent, the economy
is more likely to tend toward equilibrium. Speculative units are those borrowers
who have enough income to meet interest payments but cannot afford to pay their
entire obligations, and have to issue new debt to finance their existing liabilities.45
Ponzi units, the most unstable, are those borrowers whose cash flows will at some
point be insufficient to meet their obligations, and depend on the liquidation of
assets or rising asset prices in order to refinance and honor their debts.46
An economy’s financing stages are thus either stable or unstable, and it is the
confidence (some might say complacency) that prolonged periods of economic
stability and growth bring that moves an economy from one stage to the next.47 As
Walter Bagehot, a 19th Century editor of The Economist observed, “people are
most credulous when they are most happy.”48 In assuming the future will be like
the recent past, consumers as well as companies develop the mistaken belief that
such conditions will continue.49 They extrapolate recent trends into the future,
become more predisposed toward making investments, and are willing to take on
more debt. Bankers, as “merchants of debt,”50 have the incentive to lend as much
as possible, and susceptible to the same bias, are only too happy to oblige.
39
See Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118736585456901047.html.
40
HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (McGraw Hill 2008) (1986)
[hereinafter STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY].
41
Id.; Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis 6 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard
Coll., Working Paper No. 74, 1992), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf.
42
Buttonwood: Minsky’s moment, ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 2009, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/13415233.
43
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at 7.
44
Minsky, supra note 41.
45
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at 79.
46
Id. at 226.
47
Minsky’s moment, supra note 42.
48
Wild-animal spirits, supra note 28.
49
Minsky’s moment, supra note 42.
50
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at 279.
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D. The Problem with Debt
Despite the advice that Polonius gives his son in William Shakespeare’s
Hamlet to “neither a borrower nor a lender be,”51 borrowing has its merits. It gives
the thrifty an opportunity to earn interest on their savings, and allows individuals
and companies to consume more or make investments which could otherwise not
have been made, contributing to economic growth.52 Furthermore, it can enable
risk to be efficiently allocated between parties. However, it has an important side
effect, namely that it feeds its way into asset prices.
Minsky himself partly attributed his ideas to the works of J.M. Keynes and
the Polish economist Michał Kalecki, who made the assertion that the structure of
aggregate demand determines profits.53 To escape from the “paradox of thrift,” in
which a section of the economy undermines its own income by saving and thus
reducing the income (and demand) of other sections, Keynes reckoned that if one
agent – the government – would spend enough money, it could boost demand and
increase profits, setting off a benign cycle of economic expansion.54 Whereas
Keynes’ General Theory emphasized the aggregate quantity of investment which
through the spending multiplier affects output, Minsky’s contribution was to focus
on how the investment is financed.55 Minsky took Keynes’ position a step further,
and argued that the accumulation of debt could lead to a self enforcing spiral.56 As
the availability of credit reaches higher levels, so does disposable income and thus
demand.57 This in turn feeds into higher profits and, consequently, higher asset
prices, thereby ratifying the decision to borrow more money to spend on these
assets.58
Soros’ theory takes into account the effects of credit on the reflexive process,
namely on the relationship between the number of loans being made and the value
of collateral.59 As borrowing stimulates economic activity, higher profits and asset
prices also raise the value of collateral.60 More lending can thus positively affect
borrowers’ creditworthiness, enabling them to borrow even more.61
51
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET. Although Polonius’ chief concern was that lending money to
friends would cause resentment (putting the lender at risk of losing his money as well as his friend)
rather than any financial crises. Id.
52
BISHOP, supra note 15.
53
Minsky had even declared that his hypothesis was “an interpretation of the substance of Keynes’
General Theory.” Paul McCulley, The Shadow Banking System and Hyman Minsky’s Economic
Journey, Global Cent. Bank Focus, May 2009, http://media.pimco-global.com/pdfs/pdf/GCB%20
Focus%20May%2009.pdf?WT.cg_n=PIMCO-US&WT.ti=GCB%20Focus%20May%2009.pdf.
54
COOPER, supra note 8, at 119.
55
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall Wray, Minsky’s Stabilizing an Unstable Economy: Two
Decades Later, in STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40, at xi-xxxv (McGraw Hill
2008) (1986).
56
COOPER, supra note 8, at 119.
57
Papadimitriou & Wray, supra note 55, at xxiv.
58
Id.
59
ALCHEMY OF FINANCE, supra note 30, at 81.
60
COOPER, supra note 8, at 100.
61
For example, consider an economy with one bank and only one company, whose stock is worth
$100 million and consists of 1 million shares of $100. A broker might buy these at $100 and sell them
at $101. The broker’s customer, looking to invest, buys 100 of them and the broker, noting the increase
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The problem however is that as this process continues, prices of assets stop
reflecting their underlying value, and instead reflect the amount of credit available
as well as people’s (biased) expectations of what the future holds, and a bubble is
formed. Note that at this stage the ability of investors to objectively judge the
correct price of assets is significantly undermined.62 As credit creation, profit
formation and asset price inflation all affect each other, it becomes apparent that
the fundamentals which themselves reflect cash flows fail to provide investors with
any external measures of value. Bernanke has stated that Minsky and
Kindleberger, in arguing for the inherent instability of the financial system, “have
had to depart from the assumption of rational behavior,”63 but once one takes into
consideration how the fundamentals are themselves unreliable it seems entirely
rational for investors to be misled by balance sheets. Unfortunately, in the midst of
rising asset prices, the incentive to refrain from borrowing and investing is muted,
and by relying on these figures investors themselves also fuel the boom. As an
inherent feature of the system, credit expansion thus has the propensity to
perpetuate the economic cycle.
Unfortunately, it does more than just that. Leverage can enhance returns on
equity, but it also exposes the borrower to additional risk,64 as payments to
creditors stay fixed regardless of incomes. When these dwindle or costs rise, the
highly leveraged debtor – such as the subprime borrower – is more likely to face
insolvency, and excessive levels of debt thus leaving individual borrowers badly
positioned to absorb adverse shocks. As the economy reaches a stage where Ponzi
financing dominates, a change in investor sentiment, or attempts by the authorities
to purge inflation through monetary constraint, the risk grows that speculative units
become Ponzi units. These, in turn, see their net worth vanish, as rising interest
rates mean their expenses rise above their incomes, and they are forced to liquidate
their assets in order to repay their loans, triggering a fall in asset prices.
The word “credit” is Latin in origin, and comes from the word “credere,” or
“to believe.”65 Creditors must believe their borrowers to be creditworthy; if they
suspect otherwise, they might demand payment of existing debt or refuse to roll it
over. Lending – like a Ponzi scheme – thus depends on confidence. Large build
ups of debt in continuous need of refinancing – like Minsky’s Ponzi units – make
an economy especially prone to crises of confidence.66 These units, with little to
in demand, now sells them at $102, while buying them at $101. The bank, meanwhile, notes that its
customers are now holding $1 million in extra collateral, and its risk management systems are telling it
that it can safely lend another $1 million. Borrowers who take the bank up on its offer meanwhile see
that stock prices have gone up, and invest the money they borrow in shares, pushing up the price even
more, in turn affecting the value of their collateral. See COOPER, supra note 8, at 103 (providing a
modified version of this example).
62
Id. at 119.
63
Rajiv Sethi, Dynamics of Learning and the Financial Instability Hypothesis, 56 J. ECON. 39, 41
(1992), http://www.springerlink.com/content/lq36n26607x46475/fulltext.pdf
64
RICHARD. S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 45 (4th ed.
2009).
65
A special report on death: Repent at leisure, ECONOMIST, June 24, 2010, available at http://
www.economist.com/node/16397110. Rather ominously, the Aramaic words for “debt” and “sin” are
the same. Id.
66
KENNETH S. ROGOFF & CARMEN M. REINHART, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF
FINANCIAL FOLLY 25 (2009).
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no margin for error, are thus extremely vulnerable to shocks, most notably rises in
short term interest rates, the drying up of liquidity or a fall in asset prices, all of
which played a role in propagating the recent crisis. The key is that a seemingly
trivial event – such as a change in investor sentiment, attempts by the authorities to
purge inflation through monetary constraint or the unexpected failure of a firm
previously considered in good health67 - is enough to generate a violent downturn
when there is an excess accumulation of risky debt.68
E. Destabilizing a Stable Economy
The gist of Minsky’s thesis is simple: that, as memories of recession fade,
the spurious belief that asset prices can only climb takes hold, and indebtedness
deepens as it is used to finance investments.69 This in turn perpetuates an asset
price spiral upwards, inducing a speculative euphoria – irrational exuberance in
Alan Greenspan’s words70 – and, as the process continues, more borrowing. In the
process, economies become susceptible to shocks and more unstable. Debt reaches
unsustainable levels, and a small shock is sufficient to send the system crashing.
Charles Kindleberger likened the economic situation after a few bubble years to a
young person riding a bike.71 There is no middle ground, and the bike, like the
economy, will become unstable lest its momentum is kept. As Ponzi units with
cash shortfalls are forced to liquidate their positions, asset values collapse,72
leading to more defaults and further rounds of price reductions. Concerns that
asset prices will further fall thus becomes a self fulfilling prophecy.73 As the
payments system freezes up, so does credit. Runs extend to healthy as well as
unhealthy banks, the economy is deprived of one of its main lifelines, and
businesses that find themselves unable to raise financing go bust.74 Recession
follows.
A core difference between the efficient market hypothesis and the financial
instability hypothesis is what makes prices move. Whereas the efficient market
hypothesis posits that any movement in price is caused by external shocks, the key
to Minsky’s model and Soros’ theory of reflexivity, is that it does not rely on these
exogenous shocks to move the economy into a particular direction, but instead
generates its own cycles, causing waves of credit expansion and asset price
inflation which perpetuate themselves. Booms and busts are thus inherent in the
67

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER &
OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2004).

ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY

68
ROBERT J. BARBERA, THE COST OF CAPITALISM: UNDERSTANDING MARKET MAYHEM AND
STABILIZING OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 33 (2009).
69
See supra, Part I.D.
70
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer
Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.: The
Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996) (available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm).
71
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67.
72
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY, supra note 40.
73
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67.
74
A survey of the world economy: On credit watch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://
www.economist.com/node/9972531.
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system, and stable economies effectively sow the seeds of their own destruction.
The notion that assets are always correctly priced – as propagated by the
efficient market hypothesis – is the main argument against countercyclical policies
and pricking bubbles, even their existence; until they burst that is, when they
miraculously become clear for all to see, and prices are suddenly declared to be
wrong, prompting central banks to intervene. Defenders of the efficient market
hypothesis also stoutly maintain that there is no such thing as an excessive level of
credit creation.75 There are numerous events that have violated the theory,
including bank runs in the absence of deposit insurance, or Long Term Capital
Management’s implosion in 1998.76 However, widespread belief in the theory has
been a driving force behind the deregulatory shifts over the last couple of decades
(such as repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act) as well as central bank policy, setting the
stage for the most severe bursting of a bubble since the Great Depression.
II. REALITY
Over the last few decades, the savings rate in the U.S. has fallen by more
than 10%, from nearly 11% of GDP in 1985 to around 1% of GDP in 2008.77 This
means that households have increased their spending by more than 10% of GDP,
some of which has invariably found its way into higher asset prices. Credit growth
as a percentage of GDP78 and household debt79 have similarly shot up. One of
the causes of this shift from saving to spending has arguably been the Federal
Reserve’s loose monetary policy. “Money always seems free”80 in manias, wrote
Charles Kindleberger, and this crisis was no exception. Throughout the past two
decades, cheap imports from emerging markets had kept inflation low, and the Fed
was able to maintain a correspondingly low federal funds rate. When interest rates
are low, consumers and businesses do not just borrow money for everyday
expenses, but also for the purchase of assets. Unsurprisingly, homes shot up in
value over the period, far outstripping gains in incomes.81
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress passed a series of statutes that deregulated
the residential mortgage market and contributed to the bubble. The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 198082 repealed usury caps
on residential mortgages, and the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of
198283 granted lenders more freedom to sell adjustable rate mortgages, effectively
75

COOPER, supra note 8, at 13.
Id. at 13.
77
U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PERSONAL SAVING 11
(2010).
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George Magnus, The Credit Cycle and Liquidity: Have we arrived at a Minsky Moment? PUBLIC
RADIO, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.publicradio.org/columns/marketplace/farrell/Economics%20
Insights%20- %20By%20George%20-%20March%202007.pdf
79
See Robert Guttmann & Dominique Plihon, Consumer Debt & Financial Fragility, 24 INT’L
REV. APPLIED ECON. 3, 269 (2010).
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KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67.
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BARBERA, supra note 68.
82
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 101-108,
94 (1980).
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Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982).
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transferring interest rate risk from lenders to borrowers. The Federal Reserve was
given the power under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 199484
to issue rules to restrict abusive lending practices, but Alan Greenspan, then the
Fed’s chairman, declined to implement them, explaining later that case by case
evaluations would have been needed to evaluate which loans were unfair.85
Interestingly, the much maligned Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which is
often cited as a cause of the crisis, had decidedly little to do with it. Critics assert
the act “forced” banks to make loans in poorer communities which would have
otherwise been unsafe and unsound,86 although it in fact merely encouraged banks
to be aware of profitable opportunities in these areas.87 Figures show that CRA
related loans accounted for only a small portion of subprime mortgages, and in any
case actually compared favorably to other types of subprime loans.88
In any case, many mortgage lenders operated with little oversight: The Wall
Street Journal estimates that a few years before the crisis more than half of all
subprime mortgages originated by companies that were not subject to federal
supervision89 and banks were able to conceal from their borrowers the true
implications of their contracts, while borrowers were no less adept at concealing
their true financial position from their creditors.90 Coupled with low interest rates,
the housing market boomed. A 2004 study by the National Association of Realtors
revealed that fully 23% of all houses in the U.S. had been bought as an investment
(not for owner occupation) and another 13% were bought as second homes.91
As homes increased in value, homeowners felt richer and were likely to
spend more. Two mortgage related innovations introduced in the 90s made this
possible.92 First, banks facilitated the refinancing of existing loans, allowing
borrowers to obtain lower interest rates, though at the cost of higher principal,
depending on house price appreciation.93 Second, home equity loans were
introduced, which were essentially second mortgages with the benefits of tax

84

Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994).
See Carol A. Needham, Listening to Cassandra: The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking
Action, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2329, 2332 (2010).
86
See, e.g., Lawrence H. White, Housing Finance and the 2008 Financial Crisis, CATO INST.
(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/hud/housing-finance-2008-financialcrisis.
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See Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Confronting Concentrated
Poverty Policy Forum, Washington, D.C.: The Community Reinvestment Act and the Recent Mortgage
Crisis (Dec. 3, 2008) (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20081203
a.htm.
88
See Neil Bhutta & Glenn Canner, Did the CRA cause the mortgage market meltdown?
COMMUNITY DIVIDENT, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, Mar. 2009, available at
http://www.minneapolis fed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4136.
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See J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, Sausages & Bailouts: Testing the Populist View of the Causes of the
Economic Crisis, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 175 (2010).
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Credit: Beware of miracle cures, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/9767665.
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The global housing boom: In come the waves, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2005, available at http://
www.economist.com/node/4079027?story_id=E1_QDSJDNS.
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Guttmann, supra note 79.
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deductible interest payments.94 Both effectively allowed homeowners to convert
home equity appreciation into cash.95
This extra spending fed into higher corporate profits and the economy
thrived. Defaults and insolvencies were fewer in number, and lenders became
more willing to lend on lax terms. For example, the Office of the Comptroller, in
its 2006 Survey of Credit Underwriting Practices, noted that due to competitive
pressures, lenders had relaxed credit underwriting standards for a third year in a
row.96 Homebuyers took advantage of these generous terms and low interest rates,
relying on rising house prices to repay the loans, reflecting the third or Ponzi stage
of Minsky’s hypothesis.97 Financing was made available based on the assumption
that house prices would keep rising,98 and borrowers with loans of 125% of the
value of the house were a typical example of Minsky’s Ponzi financing units.99 By
2006, around one third of all homebuyers in the U.S. had purchased risky
mortgages of some sort.100
A collective wave of elation had seemingly taken hold. Economic growth
was robust, and rising house prices vindicated risky financing strategies. As
Kindleberger points out, there is always a sense that “we never had it so good”
during an upturn.101 Because of globalization, improvements in technology and
securitization,102 it was widely reckoned that “this time would be different.”103 As
Minsky hypothesized, people believed the good times would continue, and
borrowed staggeringly large amounts of money to buy assets. Had the efficient
market hypothesis been true, these might have been justified investments, or prices
wouldn’t have risen by as much as they did. Instead, asset prices merely reflected
excessive credit creation and a specious euphoria. Rising house prices encouraged
borrowers to borrow more, and the high levels of debt they had accumulated were
enough to leave them badly positioned to deal with adverse shocks. A long period
of stability had inevitably spawned its own instability, and when the shock came,
the bubble inevitably ended not with a pop, but with a crash.
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Id.
See id.
96
See George Magnus, The Credit Cycle: Getting Closer to a Minsky Moment? (July 3, 2007),
http://www.publicradio.org/columns/marketplace/farrell/George%20Magnus%20020707.pdf.
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See supra Part I.C.
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Buttonwood: Ponzificating, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/
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101
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 67.
102
See ROGOFF & REINHART, supra note 66, at 20.
103
Id.
95

GLOSSOP_-_FORMAT_COMPLETE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

4/18/2012 5:59 PM

INHERENT INSTABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

495

II. THE BUBBLE BURSTS
In order to combat inflationary pressures as a result of rising energy prices,
in April 2004 the Fed raised its funds rate from 1% by twenty-five basis points.104
Seventeen105 consecutive interest rate hikes over the next few years eventually
found their way into higher mortgage rates, and demand for new housing
slackened.106 Faced with higher loan repayments, strapped homeowners started to
default. Risky mortgages bore the brunt of the defaults at first, but as waves of
foreclosures saw the value of banks’ collateral fall, prime borrowers soon
followed.
The initial disruption may have been small, but it was enough to burst the
housing bubble and eventually precipitate the economy into a descending spiral of
margin calls, sour loans and a credit crunch leading to the soup kitchens.107 Just as
the previously “virtuous” cycle of rising asset prices and profits had reinforced
itself, so the damaging hangover that followed spiraled downwards in what is
known as a positive feedback loop. According to Soros, it is the sudden
liquidation of accumulated positions that gives busts such a different shape: The
frenzied liquidation of collateral in order to satisfy creditors leads to a rapid
decline in collateral prices,108 thereby depriving many more creditors the chance to
recover. Minsky, too, recognized that as Ponzi units with cash shortfalls are forced
to liquidate their positions, asset values collapse.109 Irving Fisher’s words, from
the early 1930s, seem presciently appropriate today:
Over-investment and over-speculation are often important; but they would have far
less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed money. The very effort
of individuals to lessen their burden of debts increases it, because of the mass effect
of the stampede to liquidate . . . . [T]he more debtors pay, the more they owe. The
more the economic boat tips, the more it tends to tip. It is not tending to right itself,
but is capsizing.110

III. CAPITAL
The demise of the subprime borrower went on to highlight the dangers of
overleveraging at a different type of borrower altogether, namely financial
institutions. Banks and other financial firms, which had invested heavily in
securities linked to subprime mortgages, saw the value of their assets drop and a
number of them suffered crises of confidence resulting in bailouts and government
rescue packages. Many of these banks relied on short term financing to fund their
operations while investing long in illiquid (and toxic) assets. Their capital
positions were flimsy: Lehman Brothers at one point had a debt to equity ratio of
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

(1933).
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Irving Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 334, 337

GLOSSOP_-_FORMAT_COMPLETE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

496

4/18/2012 5:59 PM

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. IV:II

35:1,111 and Bear Stearns had a similar ratio.112
Northern Rock, a British mortgage lender, was a particularly painful
reminder of the dangers of overreliance on money market funding and few deposits
to rely on. Despite starting the year promisingly and announcing pretax profits of
£627 million ($1.2 billion) for 2006,113 it suffered a liquidity crisis it was not able
to weather. Fear that it would default in the future – thanks to its losses on
mortgage securities – was enough for commercial money market lenders to refuse
to renew its loans, sending it cap in hand to the British government.114 A few had
previously voiced concerns about the practice of relying on short term financing.
MIT alumnus and Italian banker Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, then on the Board of
Directors at the ECB, stated as far back as the beginning of the decade that for all
its advantages, this type of “liquidity may be more prone to dry up when it is most
needed.”115 Even Moody’s, which would go on to be widely berated for its
fallacious ratings, warned of British banks’ vulnerability to disruption in the
wholesale markets.116
Many others, however, including regulators, failed to see this, and as a result
of its funding problems, Northern Rock went on to suffer Britain’s first bank run in
140 years.117 As its failure proved, a sudden lack of liquidity can destroy a balance
sheet in a short period of time,118 and the implosion in 2007-2008 came about
precisely because many highly leveraged firms financed their illiquid investments
using short term borrowing119 which they were unable to renew.
IV. PROTRACTION
When the system does implode, the contraction is “a mirror image of the
expansion.”120 Whereas growth during the boom was higher than it should have
been, so the bust will be more severe. According to Rogoff and Reinhart, the
average downturn following a debt-fuelled housing bubble is four to six years – in
sharp contrast to the “pure stock market crash”121 at the beginning of this century
which, even though preceded by a record high composite index value, was a much
111

See Colesanti, supra note 89.
Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, CNN, Mar. 31, 2008, available at http://money.
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113
Northern Rock: Lessons of the fall, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/9988865?story_id=E1_JJRRRGV.
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Helen Nugent, Northern Rock is bailed out by Bank of England, THE TIMES (UK), Sept. 14,
2007, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/
article2449595.ece.
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less protracted affair, with more benign growth rates and lower unemployment
figures in its aftermath.122
As the U.S., Britain, Ireland, Spain, and other countries set for periods of
fiscal austerity are now discovering, households and companies paying off their
debts will inevitably spend less money on consumption or investment, thereby
depressing profits and keeping economic recovery fragile. The debt build-up of
the last few decades has been unprecedented in size, and, during the time required
to reduce it, the U.S. economy (and others) will likely experience depressed rates
of growth,123 which in turn will reduce tax revenues124 and employment prospects.
Excessive levels of debt thus not only reinforce asset price spirals that end up
destabilizing the economy, but they also amplify the severity of the ensuing
downturn.
V. ASIAN CRISIS
The recent financial crisis was by no means the only one with credit at its
root. The unhindered expansion of credit also played a role, in varying degrees, in
the Great Depression,125 the Japanese stock market crash of the late 80s, and the
Asian financial crisis of the late 90s.126 The latter, in particular, shares a number
of further traits with the recent crisis.
For example, large numbers of banks in countries such as Thailand, where
the weakness of the banking system was arguably the chief cause behind the panic
that followed, were also highly leveraged (many in fact technically insolvent),
leading the way for crises of confidence in which foreign investors fell over each
other to withdraw their investments.127 Few countries in the region had banks with
capital ratios even close to 8%.128 Thai banks excessively expanded credit during
the upturn, employing weak credit controls. Rather than assess cash flow or the
strength of balance sheets, banks would lend solely on the basis of collateral.129
Much of the money that was being lent found its way into real estate, which also
was being used as collateral, further artificially inflating the bubble and allowing
banks to look healthier than they were. When the bubble burst, collateral turned
out to be worth much less than banks had anticipated, and numerous banks were
bailed out by their governments.130
Furthermore, just as loose monetary policy, excess savings from abroad and
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sub-par lending standards helped fuel the boom in the United States prior to the
recent crisis, during the Asian crisis an overflow of cash from developed
economies resulted in overinvestment in unproductive assets and a similar
misallocation of capital on a grand scale. The financial crisis that engulfed Asia in
the late 90s was due to structural weaknesses different from America’s today and
eventually manifested itself in a currency panic.131 However, its underlying nature
was the same: an investment boom fueled by easy money.132
While the features of each crisis are never identical, there is often a similar
pattern.133 The experience of the recent crisis, as well as that of the Great
Depression and the Asian Crisis, suggest that the common denominator is the
expansion of credit. The similarities may therefore serve as an indicator that in
order to avoid future crises or at least mitigate their impact, the availability of
credit and levels of debt and bank capital are the key issues that need to be
addressed.
VII. PROPOSALS
A. Credit Creation
The cost of debt is measured by the interest paid on it, and interest rates – at
least in the short to medium term – are determined by central banks, be it the
Federal Reserve in the United States or the Bank of England in the U.K.134
Through monetary policy, central banks manage the credit creation process.
Although mandates vary,135 a key focus for many central banks is price stability,
particularly consumer price inflation. In addition, central banks act as lenders of
last resort, in order to reduce the likelihood of bank runs by offering a form of
insurance to depositors.136
Low interest rates encourage people to borrow rather than save, as returns
from savings decrease whereas it becomes cheaper to borrow. Investors put
money into bonds (of which prices move inversely to interest rates) and riskier
assets such as stocks, which promise higher returns. As it becomes cheaper for
companies to fund acquisitions with debt, they go on a buying spree. When the
markets tumble, central banks intervene and will lower interest rates in order to
stop the decline. While politically expedient at the time, the pain is merely
postponed as it simply encourages people to borrow again, “saving the economy
from disaster but raising the stakes still further when the next crisis comes
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around.”137 Thus, central banks in effect exacerbate the credit cycle, fueling
demand and stoking asset price inflation to create bubbles.
While still a Federal Reserve governor, Ben Bernanke argued that it was
simply not the job of monetary policy to target housing bubbles; instead, he
thought, targeting housing bubbles should be the job of regulatory policy.138 As
some of the blame for the housing bubble has rightly been reserved for residential
mortgage deregulation, one can see why. However, had a housing bubble been
prevented, an asset bubble in another sector of the economy might have formed, as
cheap money would have found its way into other types of assets. Managing the
credit creation process properly is therefore crucial if these damaging cycles are to
be avoided.
If central banks keep refusing to prick asset bubbles and continue to focus on
consumer price inflation, this is highly unlikely to happen. The most effective
policy would surely be to have higher interest rates and require central banks to
avoid the creation of excessive bubbles by preemptively pricking them before they
reach a point where they pose a systemic risk.139
By shifting a central bank’s mandate from targeting consumer price inflation
to asset price inflation, its monetary policy would shift to the supervision of
inherently unstable financial markets, thus “leaning against” the use of speculative
and Ponzi finance.140 One possible way of achieving this could be to compare
credit growth or growth in asset prices to the level of growth in an economy
generally. Other indicators that would inform a central bank when to act could
include growth in lending activity, the stock of debt as a fraction of the economy,
or the debt service burden as a fraction of income.141 The attraction of using these
variables is that other macroeconomic data become distorted by financial bubbles,
and so credit growth becomes the key variable.142
Another possible solution would be to monitor credit spreads. Some have
suggested that bubbles form when risk appetites are high and credit spreads are
tight,143 which was also apparent during the years in the run up to the crash of
2007-2008. If credit spreads had been monitored more closely by the Federal
Reserve when it was raising interest rates in 2004 through 2006, it might have
tightened policy in a more aggressive manner, and house prices would have fallen
earlier, albeit followed by a milder recession.144
The proposal is not without its flaws. The main argument against the
approach is that because it is impossible to identify the correct price of an asset,
central bankers can only spot a bubble ex post. However, this is marred by the
assertion that asking central banks to spot bubbles does not necessarily involve
137
Buttonwood: credit and blame, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2008, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/12209655?story_id=E1_TNNDJGVV.
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identifying the correct price of an asset, in the same way that central banks are not
required to know what the appropriate prices of everyday goods are in order to
monitor consumer price inflation.145 Both policies merely require an assessment of
what an acceptable increase in price is. However, this leads to another problem,
which is that central banks will inevitably employ arbitrary benchmarks by which
to measure acceptable increases in these variables. If the central bank errs on the
side of caution, the expansion will come to a halt sooner than it might otherwise
have; taking a liberal approach will similarly prolong the boom, but make the
downturn more serious. There is a degree of truth to this. However, it may be
argued that much government intervention is arbitrary, but nevertheless desirable
in that it achieves predictability and in this case a degree of stability.
The real challenge, however, will likely come not from macroeconomic
variables, but the electorate. The cost of pricking asset bubbles and avoiding an
aftermath bogged down by debt would invariably involve a larger number of
smaller, less damaging credit cycles, which would still negatively impact the
economy in their own ways. Economic growth would certainly not be as high as a
result, and shorter term cyclicality would likely negatively impact employment
levels and asset prices. As a rejoinder to these arguments, it is helpful to quote
Ludwig von Mises on the subject:
There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit
expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the
result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and
total catastrophe of the currency system involved.146

Credit, it has been noted, is an integral part of our financial system, and one
which has its benefits if used appropriately. If Minsky’s theories are indeed
correct, an expansion of credit, unless halted by government, will end in a crash.147
The dilemma before us, it thus seems, is simply how severe we want the downturn
to be. No outcome is without its drawbacks, but the key will be to convince voters
that the costs associated with a credit fuelled expansion are simply too high, and
that monetary policy cannot be used to counteract all economic downturns.148
Given the ordeal the United States and other economies have been through in
recent years, the choice should not be difficult.
B. Capital Requirements
The crisis may have had its origins in the subprime borrower, but, as noted
above, it was the over-extended financial institutions that caused the system to
crash.149 People tend to be guilty of the “sin of extrapolation” – that is, “they look
145
COOPER, supra note 8, at 164. Cooper proposes, only half in jest, that if central banks cannot
spot asset price bubbles of the magnitude recently experienced, they should perhaps follow Milton
Friedman’s advice and consider shutting up shop altogether. See id.
146
LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS Ch. XX.8 (1949), available
at http://mises.org/humanaction/chap20sec8.asp.
147
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148
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149
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back at the performance of assets and extrapolate an even rosier future” – and
bankers are no exception.150 Banks play a role not just in the perpetuation of the
credit-asset cycle, but also in providing the catalyst to send the system downhill.
Because of their over-reliance on debt, fractional reserve banking and other
methods of short term financing, financial institutions are more susceptible to
crises of confidence than firms in other industries.151 One study of banking crises
has found these crises to be most common at the peak of a boom in house prices,152
and there is empirical evidence that banking crises significantly amplify
recessions.153 Therefore, improved regulation at financial institutions might
therefore reduce the likelihood that these will pose a systemic risk.
Minsky stressed that any regulation and supervision in banking would be a
never-ending struggle, given that what might be “an appropriate structure at one
time is not appropriate at another.”154 If we take Minsky’s hypothesis to its logical
conclusion this is surely the correct analysis. Counter-cyclical policies could be an
effective safeguard against the excessive build up of debt, while preventing
institutions from becoming too fragile to pose systemic risks. A key argument
against higher capital requirements is that they reduce the amount of capital
available for lending, and can thus dent growth and economic expansion.155
Minsky’s insights, however, can be applied to suggest that capital restraints might
be strengthened as the boom progresses, and the aim is to vary capital ratios
according to credit growth and market circumstances. If higher capital standards
are imposed gradually as the cycle progresses, it will make banks more resilient,
and thus would reduce speculative lending as fewer funds are available for
borrowing.
This approach will result in accumulating capital during upswings that are
used as buffers during downturns. Additionally, the variable – credit – used to
determine the capital ratio, is flexible, and which ratio to maintain would depends
on each bank’s circumstances, while still nevertheless restraining aggregate credit
growth in a given economy; perhaps an increase in the value of a bank’s assets can
provide a mechanism through which to determine appropriate levels. This
proposal mirrors Spain’s system of “dynamic provisioning,” to which there are
several counter-arguments.
First, the period through which banks would be required to hold higher levels
of capital would presumably extend to economic downturns, thus reducing the
amount banks can lend precisely when credit is already in short supply.156 Yet the
scarcity of credit is a common feature that follows all banking crises as borrowers
150
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default and force a pullback in other bank lending.157 Banks with low levels of
capital may also resist the temptation to make loans out of fear that capital
cushions are insufficient,158 and even relaxed capital requirements or improved
liquidity may not encourage banks to lend more. To quote, from an article by
Andrew Ross Sorkin, an anonymous senior official at a big bank which had
received money from the government: ‘“[i]t doesn’t matter how much [former
Treasury Secretary] Hank Paulson gives us. . . no one is going to lend a nickel until
the economy turns.’ The official then added: “Who are we going to lend money
to?” before repeating an old saw about banking: ‘Only people who don’t need
it.’”159
Second, even though Spain’s banks came out of the crisis in relatively better
shape than their Northern European counterparts, they were still heavily exposed to
the real estate sector, and Spain has been grappling with Europe’s worst
unemployment rates over the last few years.160 Note, however, that Spain’s
unemployment rate never dipped below 8% even before the boom, and its current
high rate is as much a result of its competitiveness and its restrictive labor
regulations.161 Even if Spain did not escape unscathed, its rules nevertheless
helped its banks avoid some of the catastrophes that countries such as Britain and
the United States have suffered by preparing for the downside of the cycle.162
There are two systems which can be used to implement dynamic
provisioning: a formula driven system, which would depend on using a
predetermined metric, and a discretionary system, that would require the bank
regulator to judge what levels of capital would be feasible given the stage of the
macroeconomic cycle.163 The success of the discretionary system would depend
on the quality and the independence of the judgments made.164 In addition, the
system would hinge – as with all rules – on how regulators, who don’t necessarily
have the proper incentives, enforce it. In the United States, the problem is one of
interagency competition, with regulators competing for territory at the expense of
prudent standards.165 In Europe, where a shift from national regulators to a
European Union wide regulatory body is occurring, the danger is that risk is in fact
exacerbated since the authorities in charge will not be the ones to pick up the bill
when another meltdown occurs.166 All regulators are susceptible to lobbying. For
157
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these reasons, a formula based system would be more effective.
Whether the requirements will help avert another meltdown might ultimately
come down to how much capital they will require banks to set aside. Spain’s
provisions did not stop the rise in house prices, and when a boom is large enough,
the impact of additional provisions can be marginal.167 For instance, core capital
of around ten percent of risk-adjusted assets would have been sufficient to soak up
the losses at most banks during 2007 through 2009.168 However, no feasible ratios
will be enough to avoid distress at banks whose losses were several times those of
the average bank,169 and firms such as UBS and Citigroup had write-offs that
greatly exceeded the buffer built up by Spain’s larger banks.170 Furthermore,
critics contend that dynamic provisioning, on its own, did not maintain the Spanish
banks’ health, and the way off-balance sheet entities were treated played a critical
part. As a result of regulatory demands that firms set aside comparable amounts of
capital against assets in off-balance sheet vehicles as against assets on the balance
sheet, Spanish banks altogether avoided setting up special investment vehicles.171
However, this result suggests that the proposals could be workable if carried out in
conjunction with other structural reforms, including a tighter monetary policy,
which might have prevented some of the excesses in Spain’s housing market.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has argued that the financial system, rather than being selfcorrective, is in fact self-enforcing. The financial system, if left to its own devices,
is inherently prone to busts, rather than tending towards a stable equilibrium which
would see continued economic growth and prosperity. Or, to paraphrase Minsky,
stability leads to instability. Regulators would do well to bear this theory in mind,
as individuals cannot be relied upon to hold back from perpetuating the cycle. The
key, therefore, would be to adopt progressively stricter measures that restrain the
creation of debt and the level of indebtedness as the system edges closer towards
instability.
The main attraction of this counter-cyclical approach, as applied to central
banks as well as financial institutions, is that it manages to balance two competing
and vital concerns. One the one hand, an over-zealous, one-size-fits-all approach
to regulation of the economy may, at best, produce few benefits and, at worst, be
counterproductive by stifling lending, innovation, and the efficient allocation of
resources which have brought unprecedented prosperity to many parts of the world
in recent decades.
On the other hand, if regulators fail to implement the appropriate reforms, we
are likely to see a repeat of the last few years—surely, a no less undesirable
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167
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alternative. A regulatory approach that reflects Minsky’s ideas might thus allow
the economy to go ahead, only pulling the reins as the economy overheats—or, in
the now famous words of the longest-serving Federal Reserve chairman, William
McChesney Martin Jr., “to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets
going.”172 The suggested proposals reflect this idea.
I have purposefully refrained from focusing on suggestions that would target
some of the housing-market related deficiencies that contributed to the recent
crisis, although a few initiatives might certainly go some way toward preventing
another housing bubble. More prudent supervision might certainly be in order, and
lenders could be required to demand higher down payments on houses as the
economic cycle progresses, which could be assessed through establishing whether
houses themselves are overvalued as determined by rents. This measure would
reduce speculative borrowing, and reduce risk to borrowers through lower debt
repayments. In addition, more prudent supervision may require banks to
progressively accept collateral of a higher value, or restrict the type of collateral
that they can accept at the more advanced stages of the cycle.
However, we should arguably look beyond the details of the recent housing
bubble and instead improve the system that helped facilitate it.173 Churchill once
quipped, “It is a joke in Britain to say that the War Office is always preparing for
the last war.”174 Likewise, regulators and policymakers risk falling into disrepute
if they continue to adhere to an idea of market efficiency that is replete with flaws
while focusing on yesterday’s problems. The attraction of the views expounded by
Minsky reflects the notion that the narrative of the recent financial crisis followed
his theories, and in the years leading up to the crisis, the housing market saw the
unraveling of a Ponzi type scheme.175 The press has coined the phrase a “Minsky
Moment” to describe the beginnings of the crisis, but Minsky’s work was not
concerned with moments, but rather the long-term view of system’s structure.176
The strength of his hypothesis is that it provides a framework through which to
analyze not just this crisis, but others as well.
Defaulting homeowners and bank runs were important sources of fragility,177
as repeated rises in interest rates were enough to push many into default, with
consequences that are now well known. However, the frailty of borrowers
extended beyond individuals and firms to economies as a whole: Iceland’s and
Ireland’s debt-to-GDP ratios reached an astonishing 1,200% and 700%,
respectively, before tumbling into crises178 from which they have yet to recover.
Empirical work has shown that the risk of a crisis is greatly elevated when a
housing boom is accompanied by a sharp increase in debt,179 and figures show that
172
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countries with large current account deficits, such as Iceland, Ireland, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, suffered some of the more severe banking
crises at the end of the 2000s.180 If these anecdotes tell us anything, it is that the
accumulation of debt can reach unsustainable levels. Debt is a crucial driver of the
processes that Minsky described, and, while the extension of credit can be the
source of investment and wealth creation, it is also the source of financial
instability.181
Minsky himself was modest about his own policy prescriptions, declaring
that he felt more comfortable “with [his] diagnosis of what ails our economy . . .
than with the remedies” he proposed.182 Similarly, the suggestions here do not
purport to act as a panacea and are not free from criticism. Apart from some of the
specific limitations mentioned above, a number of general limitations should also
be borne in mind. First and foremost, a vital component of the inherent instability
of the system is that supposedly rational humans make it so; if this theory is
correct, then surely the humans in charge of the regulators are no less prone to
making the same mistakes. Placing too much faith in regulation may miss the
point that many financial innovations occurred in response to incentives created by
the same regulations.183 Off-balance sheet vehicles and derivatives allowed banks
to hold less capital, whereas credit default swaps allowed banks to convert risky
assets that require higher levels of capital into assets that do not.184 The danger is
that banks in the future will merely circumvent the rules through more innovation,
employing even more dangerous methods of hiding risk. While regulators “with
spine are still better than invertebrates,”185 any solution that necessarily relies on
regulatory bodies must recognize these limits. These limits, however, should not
be construed as indicative of the inevitable failure of improved regulations, but
only as indicators of the existence of certain obstacles. The design of today’s
financial and monetary architecture is the best in history,186 and the tools at our
disposal should nonetheless be sufficient to mitigate the effects of the system’s
inherent instability, enhancing our prosperity in the long run.
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